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ABSTRACT 
 
There are numerous motives that stimulate investors (bidders) in the market for corporate 
control to compete for the right to manage the assets of other companies (targets). These 
motives are not only numerous and different in nature, they can also be conflicting and 
dynamically changing during the process of each takeover – statistical models that predict 
takeover probabilities for individual companies in general will be crippled by this 
complexity of the real life.   
 
If different bidders have different preferences about the characteristics of potential targets 
and these characteristics are at least partially reflected in publicly available information, 
then a model (based on publicly available information) predicting probability of becoming 
a takeover target for individual companies is by definition sub-optimal.  Obviously, the 
continual race of researchers to prove whose or which theory is the ‘right one’ is doomed 
to be fruitless. 
 
I test this hypothesis by constructing and comparing a set of ordered probit models for 38 
takeover motives and for the probability of takeover, as well.  The analysis is based on a 
sample of 275 privatised companies in Slovenia (24.1% of the population).  A set of 
explanatory variables consists of financial ratios derived from individual financial 
statements of the companies, other selected publicly available information and additional 
data gathered with questionnaires.  The empirical investigation shows that the hypothesis 
stated above cannot be rejected. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION
 
 
The intensity of takeovers measured by their frequency and size has been growing 
significantly during the last decade.  This is the case not only for the USA or UK but also 
for the rest of the world, including continental Europe (Sudarsanam, 1995; Wagstyl, 1997; 
Reed, 1999).  Takeovers are also the inseparable companion of the process called 
globalisation.  Besides growth in their number, what is even more striking, is the size of 
individual international takeovers that has by far surpassed everything that the corporate 
world has ever seen in the past.  This is especially true for the automobile producers, 
banking and telecommunications industries, but also for other sectors of economic activity 
(some of the most notorious cases of this type are: Daimler - Chrysler, Deutsche Bank AG 
- Bankers Trust Corporation, Mannesmann - Vodafone).  
 
On the other hand, privatisation in most of the so-called ‘transition economies’ is 
practically finished.  This is also the case for Slovenia, which started this process back in 
1993, and is now facing a whole new set of problems and opportunities - previously 
unknown to this economy.  A highly dispersed ownership structure, which is the outcome 
of the Slovenian privatisation model, lack of financial tradition, masses of unsophisticated 
shareholders are only some of the characteristics of the present Slovenian capital market 
and the market for corporate control, as well.1 
 
Intensity, techniques and overall importance of takeovers substantially vary from country 
to country, depending on corporate governance mechanisms, size and structure of the 
capital markets, importance of banks and other sources of capital, legislature, tradition, etc.  
Therefore, significant differences can be expected between countries in the relevance of 
individual takeover motives, number of takeovers and also in their economic 
consequences.   
 
                                               
1
  More about privatisation in Slovenia and its consequences see Mramor 1996, 2000 and Ribnikar 1996, 
1999. 
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Nevertheless, the hypothesis that was tested in this research on a sample of Slovenian 
companies is expected to be universal.  While the relevance of individual takeover motives 
will change in time and will be different in different environments, the main issue is that 
there is no single motive or theory that can explain the whole set of takeovers.2  Different 
motives can (not necessarily or always) be related to different preferences of bidders about 
desired characteristics of potential target companies.  The obvious consequence of this 
simple fact are the problems with constructing prediction models for future takeovers.3  In 
this paper, I investigate this hypothesis by constructing a set of models for takeover 
probability and 38 takeover motives. 
 
 
2. TAKEOVER THEORIES AND PREDICTION MODELS 
 
The scientific field of takeovers is extremely broad, heterogeneous in its nature – even 
eclectic – and even more it is dynamically changing all the time (for a systematic overview 
see Weston, Chung and Hoag, 1990).  There is no dominant explanation (theory or 
hypothesis) with ambition and realistic potential to scientifically rationalise a wide set of 
different takeovers, which are direct or indirect outcomes of numerous, complementary or 
conflicting, and sometimes even offsetting motives.   
 
                                               
2
  Even more – if there was a superior prediction model (that would enable investor(s) to make extra 
profits), the investor(s) ‘using it’ would, doing so, change the ‘rules of the game’ and the model would 
become useless as any other.  Using a superior prediction model would actually mean exploring the 
market inefficiencies and consequentially eliminating them.  Even if the investor in possession of a 
superior prediction model would not have sufficient funds to change the prices in the capital market 
himself (therefore eliminate its inefficiency revealed by the model), he would eventually grow in size by 
making extra profits, other investors would start copying his behaviour and one should not forget the 
option of selling the model to a bigger (the biggest) investor(s) in the market, that would only speed up 
this process.  To make a long story short: if there was a superior prediction model it would ‘function’ 
only until it is used in real life.  Extra profits using it would diminish to zero (excluding transaction 
costs), while the speed of this process would depend on the relative size of investments based on the 
model and capability of other investors to follow the most successful investor(s). 
3
  Prediction models never stopped to attract attention of researchers and investors in the capital market.  
The reason is in the takeover premiums that average around 30%, but can reach even more than 100% in 
individual takeovers.  Investors that would be able to predict future targets of takeovers better than other 
investors in the market could make extra profits.  Obviously, the best performing prediction models are 
not to be published in academic literature – at least not while they are still functioning – they should be 
(and probably are, if they exist) exploited in real life. 
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Figure 1: Fuzzy logic of takeovers 
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But in spite of a vast number of empirical research papers, articles and books dealing with 
takeovers, there is still a gap in understanding the causal logic between different motives of 
different potential bidders, characteristics of potential targets (companies), and the 
probability that a certain company will actually become a takeover target.  Especially the 
empirical research, which is directed towards construction of more efficient prediction 
models, seems to be seriously crippled by the fact that the complexity and dynamics of 
motives
 has not been satisfactorily given attention, yet.   
 
Another important conclusion that can be drawn from comparing different studies and 
prediction models (for a comparative overview see Rees, 1990) is the simple fact, that 
different researchers use different samples (size, time, location, selection criteria) and find 
different sets of financial ratios and other information as statistically significant – 
sometimes these are (even) partially the same, but the directions of relations are different.  
Testing the prediction power of models on the same data (or parts of the same sample), that 
was used to construct them, will usually result in overly optimistic evaluation of their 
quality.  Since there are not two different studies (at least not known to the author of this 
article) that revealed the same set of explanatory variables as statistically significant, it 
seems necessary to further investigate the background of this phenomena. 
 
That is why the main emphasis in my research is given to a set of possible motives that 
make different investors become bidders for other companies - called targets.  I 
hypothesise that different motives of bidders are reflected in their different preferences 
about characteristics of target companies.  These characteristics are at least partially visible 
to the capital market by evaluating publicly available information.  Among others, 
financial statements reported by individual companies offer a source to produce a set of 
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financial ratios that can be used - in combination with other publicly available information 
- to predict the importance of individual motives for individual target companies. 
 
Since there can be more than one potential bidder interested for the same target company, 
while the motives of these bidders can be the same or different (complementary, 
conflicting, offsetting), I hypothesise that general models predicting takeover probability 
for individual companies are at least in some cases crippled in their efficiency due to 
statistically significant offsetting relations.4  These are thoroughly studied in the empirical 
investigation. 
 
Figure 2: Motives - complementarities and offsetting effects 
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4
  More about methodology in financial analysis and prediction models for takeovers see Rees, 1990. 
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3.  METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
 
The population of companies that was addressed by a questionnaire, was defined on the 
basis of an objective criteria: Slovenian companies that were privatised by 01.04.1998 
(1139 companies) - more accurately - they acquired the ‘second approval’ from the 
Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Restructuring and Privatisation as a necessary 
condition for Court Registry entry.  The questionnaire was prepared, tested and sent to all 
1139 companies.5  In the first round, 155 questionnaires were collected from these 
companies and in the second round 120 (questionnaires were sent again to the rest of the 
companies - 984).  Altogether the size of the sample was 275 privatised Slovenian 
companies and the overall response rate was 24.1%. 
 
To obtain further information necessary to complete the research, interviews with 
governmental officials and with managers of some privatised companies were organised 
and executed.  These meetings proved to be very informative and helpful in assessing the 
progress of privatisation and its consequences in Slovenia, including an intensifying of the 
takeover activity.  Additional information was gathered using Internet and home pages of 
several other governmental and non-governmental institutions like: Agency of the 
Republic of Slovenia for Securities Market, Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for 
Restructuring and Privatisation, Slovenian Development Company - all these institutions 
were also personally visited to either obtain or to verify certain information relevant to the 
research. 
 
Official financial data about privatised Slovenian companies was obtained from the 
Agency for Payments (Clearing) and was used to produce a set of financial ratios, which 
were tested in the empirical analysis.   
 
The empirical analysis was done using standard statistical packages like SPSS and 
LIMDEP (LIMited DEPendent variables – Greene, 1989).  An ordered probit model was 
used to investigate statistical relations between publicly available information about 
companies (especially financial ratios) and the estimated probability of takeovers in 
comparison to the estimated importance of the individual 38 potential motives for 
takeovers.  Takeover probability and the importance of individual motives to individual 
companies were gathered using the questionnaire.  So the publicly available information 
                                               
5
  The questionnaire was tested on a sample of 15 companies and some minor modifications to the original 
content were made before addressing the whole target population. 
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was actually used to predict the answers of the companies’ representatives (top-level 
managers).6 
 
Another important question was why not use actual takeover data instead of gathering 
management opinions about motives and probability of takeovers.  While one good 
explanation lies in the fact that the number of actually executed takeovers in Slovenia was 
relatively small (which was even more true for the years till 1999), this could not be an 
argument while analysing data from other capital markets.  Nevertheless, there is an even 
more important reason to use data gathered with questionnaires before takeovers of these 
companies are actually executed.  While predictions of takeover probabilities for individual 
companies can always be compared to the actual events in the next years, the identification 
of takeover motives is not an easy task to do at all. 
 
The main question is when are the answers of the managers about motives for potential 
takeovers of their companies more and when are they less biased.  If the company has 
already been taken over, we can expect – whether a new management was appointed or the 
old one was kept – that the answers will reflect the opinions of their bidders, i.e. new 
owners.  This is because managers could be afraid to loose their jobs, if they are not loyal 
to their new owners.   
 
One good example of this logic are officially announced takeover motives of bidders that 
typically differ from those that are communicated to the shareholders and the public by 
target companies’ managers (definitely true in hostile takeovers).  Therefore, it is less 
likely that answers of the managers will be biased before takeovers are actually executed or 
even announced than later when they are expected to support the opinions of the new 
‘bosses’ – if they want to keep their jobs.    
 
Using a questionnaire to assess opinions of top-level managers about takeover perspectives 
of their companies in relation to the characteristics of these companies (that are publicly 
available and other gathered by questionnaire) brings a fresh new look at the ‘old 
problems’.  It is also important that this methodology is applicable in any other capital 
                                               
6
  Top-level managers of the companies that represent a sample of the study were asked (among others) to 
evaluate every single motive (38) on a scale from 0 to 4 (irrelevant - ... - very relevant for the company 
he/she was representing) and the probability of takeover for their companies on a scale from 0 to 5 (very 
unlikely - ... - inevitable).  Since the dependent variables in the models were ordered and the 
independents represented a mix of scale, ordered, nominal and dummy variables (many with 
problematic distributions), an ordered probit model was selected as the most appropriate statistical tool 
(see formal explanations in Greene, 1997; Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991 and Stanovnik, 1992). 
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market.  Actually, the fact that there are huge databases for thousands of executed 
takeovers available for countries like USA and UK could have diverted the attention of 
researchers from more primary questions that can further clarify the logics of takeovers in 
general.  
 
 
4.  RESULTS AND COMMENTS 
 
In the empirical analysis, I test the hypothesis that different motives of bidders can best be 
explained using different sets of publicly available information and even more that some of 
the motives will have different directions of relations with the same explanatory variables 
– the signs of coefficient estimates in the models will be different.  The test is done by 
constructing and comparing a set of ordered probit models for 38 individual motives as 
well as for the probability of takeover in general.   
 
 
4.1. PREDICTING PROBABILITY OF TAKEOVER FOR INDIVIDUAL 
COMPANIES 
 
Overall, there are more than 60% of companies in the sample that have rated the 
probability of becoming a takeover target in the next few years as moderate, high or very 
high.7  28% of the companies have also stated that they know exactly who their potential 
bidders are. 
 
Explanatory variables that represent publicly available information and were tested in the 
models were made of three different sets: 
1. financial and other ratios calculated from financial statements of the companies, 
2. dummies for branches,  
3. dummies for other publicly available information: 
a. is the company listed in the stock market, 
b. have the shares of the company been accepted to the Central Securities 
Clearing Corporation Registry - CSCC (shares issued in a book entry form), 
c. is the Law on Takeovers applicable for the company. 
 
                                               
7
  Their answers were transformed from verbal to numerical: none – 1, very low – 2, moderate – 3, high – 
4 and very high – 5. 
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Following, I present the results of the model predicting answers of the company 
representatives about their perceptions of the probability that their companies will be taken 
over during the next few years.  Explanatory variables are grouped as: financial ratios, 
dummies for branches (publicly available information) and other dummies (the first one 
representing publicly available and the second one publicly unavailable information about 
companies).  
 
Table 1: Estimation of the ordered probit model – probability of takeover 
Variable Coefficient estimate Asymptotic standard error 
Financial ratios:    
BDVZ – gross value added per employee -0.0001 c 0.0000 
CW – cost of labour per employee 0.0001 b 0.0001 
Dummies for branches:    
SKD_24   - chemicals 0.6117 c 0.3288 
SKD_30   - electronics 0.9260 a 0.3596 
SKD_34   - transport equipment -0.7202 c 0.3807 
SKD_36   - furniture -1.8202 a 0.5740 
SKD_50   - wholesale/retail 0.3783 b 0.1680 
Other dummies:    
KA12  - company is delaying registration of 
its shares with the CSCC  
0.3212 b 0.1610 
KA63  - does not know whether the Law on 
Takeovers is applicable for the company 
-0.2996 b 0.1497 
    
Summary statistics   
Number of observations = 271 
L (c) = -432.18 
L (α) = -410.07 
χ2 (9) = 44.210 
Note: 
1. L (c) denotes the value of the likelihood function assuming all the coefficients (except the constant) are zero; 
2. L (α) denotes the value of the likelihood function on sample; 
3. a   p<0.01;   b p<0.05;   c p<0.10; 
4. 271 companies out of 275 in the sample provided all the necessary data to be processed in the model. 
 
 
The main conclusions are the following: 
1. The probability that the predicted probability of takeover will be higher 
decreases with the increase in gross value added per employee (all other things 
being equal). 
2. The probability that the predicted probability of takeover will be higher 
increases with the increase in labour cost per employee (all other things being 
equal). 
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To put it simply, representatives of companies with higher labour cost and/or lower gross 
value added per employee were most likely to predict the probability of takeover of their 
companies higher than other representatives of the companies in the sample.  In other 
words, the perception of probability of takeover was higher for companies with lower 
labour productivity and/or higher wages.   
 
While there were no market ratios tested in the analysis – market values like share prices 
were available only for 13 out of 275 companies in the sample – it is very interesting that 
there is not a single standard financial ratio in this model (representing profitability, 
liquidity, short and long term paying ability, leverage etc) – 33 were tested – statistically 
significant at the acceptable level (p≤0.10).  I further investigated this finding with ordered 
probit models for individual motives.  The results are summarised in Table 3.   
 
Furthermore: 
3. The probability that the predicted probability of takeover will be higher is 
higher for companies from chemicals and electronics industries and from 
wholesale/retail. 
4. The probability that the predicted probability of takeover will be higher is lower 
for companies producing transport equipment and furniture. 
 
Therefore, companies in some of the branches were more likely to have higher perceptions 
of takeover probabilities than others – chemicals, electronics and wholesale/retail.  On the 
other side, producers of transport equipment and furniture were more likely than 
companies from all other branches to evaluate the probability of takeover as very low. 
 
And: 
5. The probability that the predicted probability of takeover will be higher is 
higher for companies that were delaying registration of their shares with the 
CSCC. 
6. The probability that the predicted probability of takeover will be higher is lower 
for companies whose representatives did not know whether the Law on 
Takeovers applies to their companies or not. 
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It seems that companies, whose managers rated the probability of takeover (of their 
companies) higher than others, used a ‘delay in registration of their shares with the CSCC’ 
as a defence mechanism against takeovers.8   
 
Representatives of companies, who were not sure about the applicability of the Law on 
Takeovers in cases of their companies, rated the probability of takeover lower than others.  
These companies, whose representatives did not know the answer to the above question, 
were smaller (measured by logarithm of annual sales) and had higher shares of insider 
shareholders than other companies in the sample.9  On the other side, representatives of 
bigger companies knew the answer to the question; they had ownership structures that gave 
their managers less reassurance of shareholders support in cases of outside bidders and 
were also more afraid of becoming takeover targets.   
 
 
4.2.  INDIVIDUAL MOTIVES AND EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
In the following table there is a list of 38 motives which were thoroughly analysed in the 
ordered probit models.  The listing includes frequencies and averages for individual 
motives.  In this table, we can see that market motives are expected to prevail over 
financial and other – more specific motives.  Market motives are also expected to be the 
major driving force for foreign investors seeking takeover opportunities in Slovenia. 
 
                                               
8
  Not being registered with the CSCC represented an additional legal obstacle for the taking-over of such 
a company by undesired outside bidders. 
9
  We can make an assumption that managers of the companies with prevailing insider shareholders 
(mainly employees) felt less exposed to outside bidders counting on the loyalty of their owners-
employees in cases of undesired takeover threats.  
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Table 2: Takeover motives – frequencies and averages (in decreasing order) 
  Answers  
Rank Motives                                                                                            1 2 3 4 5 n Average 
1 B – acquiring market share (in Slovenia) of the target company 53 30 43 58 74 258 3.27 
2 C – quick entry into the Slovenian market (foreign bidder) 96 29 38 58 37 258 2.66 
3 V – high quality of human resources in the target company  75 34 81 52 16 258 2.61 
4 F – interesting products/services of target company 90 32 63 50 23 258 2.55 
5 Y – economies of scope 86 39 69 50 14 258 2.48 
6 Z – financial synergies 93 37 71 42 12 255 2.38 
7 E – acquiring distribution channels of the target company 105 49 41 38 25 258 2.34 
8 X – economies of scale 92 47 67 44 6 256 2.32 
9 W – lower labour cost 91 52 65 43 7 258 2.31 
10 Q – stable and relatively large cash flows 95 55 59 34 15 258 2.30 
11 M – undervaluation of the target company 95 52 66 37 8 258 2.27 
12 S – technologically advanced production 102 44 67 35 10 258 2.25 
13 T – unutilised production capacity 95 59 64 33 7 258 2.22 
14 J – eliminating a competitor in Slovenia (probable closedown of the target) 118 45 41 30 24 258 2.21 
15 H – strategic realignment 105 45 77 20 11 258 2.17 
16 R – unutilised credit potential 110 57 42 37 9 255 2.13 
17 P – free (excess) cash flows of the bidder  110 47 63 27 8 255 2.12 
18 A – fast growth 117 44 63 22 12 258 2.10 
19 HH – ‘split up’ – takeover and sale of parts of the company 120 49 37 29 15 250 2.08 
20 G – diversification 110 54 66 22 6 258 2.07 
21 DD – management replacement 109 59 67 16 7 258 2.04 
22 K – securing supplies (target company as a critical supplier of inputs) 131 47 39 25 14 256 2.00 
23 U – high quality of R&D department 122 57 44 28 7 258 2.00 
24 GG – speculation  125 45 38 23 13 244 1.99 
25 EE – replacement of the members of the supervisory board 125 57 49 19 8 258 1.95 
26 L – securing sales (target company as a critical buyer of bidders outputs) 135 47 46 22 8 258 1.92 
27 BB – concessions 139 48 24 23 15 249 1.90 
28 AA – tax minimisation 124 67 37 19 8 255 1.90 
29 II – hubris 132 62 32 17 8 251 1.83 
30 N – high price/earnings ratio  135 60 48 10 5 258 1.80 
31 I – eliminating a competitor in the foreign markets (probable closedown) 169 33 23 18 13 256 1.72 
32 O – low price/earnings ratio 144 66 41 6 1 258 1.66 
33 D – access to market shares of the target in foreign markets 168 36 17 15 12 248 1.66 
34 JJ – political motives 159 43 26 14 6 248 1.65 
35 LL – defence motives 150 47 34 12 2 245 1.65 
36 CC – patents, licences 164 51 23 14 4 256 1.61 
37 KK – money laundering 167 45 30 6 2 250 1.52 
38 FF – stock market quotation 174 43 14 2 1 234 1.35 
Note: above data is derived from the ordered probit models for individual motives – due to singularity 
problems some companies were removed from the sample for individual motives. 
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The results of the ordered probit models for individual motives compared to the model for 
probability of takeovers are summarised in Table 3.  Statistically significant predictive 
variables that represent publicly available information and have demonstrated different 
(offsetting) directions of relations are listed (+ and - signs are used to denote the direction 
of relation) and marked by asterisk (*).  There are also other variables listed that were 
statistically significant in 6 or more models (motives). 
 
Different sets of statistically significant explanatory variables in the models summarized 
for individual motives already support the hypothesis that bidders with different takeover 
motives differ in their attitude towards selected characteristics of target companies.   
 
What is even more convincing is that there are also several explanatory variables that are 
statistically significant in more than one model, but the directions of their relations to the 
values of individual motives are not the same.  In Table 3, these are marked by asterisk: 8 
financial ratios, 10 branches (dummies) and 3 dummies for other publicly available 
information about companies.  This means that bidders with certain motives prefer higher 
values of certain variables (representing characteristics of target companies), other bidders 
with different motives prefer lower values of the same variables and in the third group 
there are potential bidders that are indifferent towards values of these same variables.  This 
finding shows us that prediction models that do not take into account this fact of possible 
counter-effects will be at least sub-optimal if not useless.   
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Table 3: Ordered probit models – explanatory variables, probability of takeover (D1) and motives (A...LL) 
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.$                      V KDUHV UHJLV WHUHG LQ &6&&
.$             V KDUHV QRW \HW UHJ LV WHUHG LQ &6&&
.$          QRW \HW O LV WHG LQ V WRFN PDUN HW
.$          /DZ RQ 7DN HRYHUV DSSOLHV
 RIIVHWWLQJ VWDWLVWL FDO UHODWLRQV
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5.  CONCLUSIONS – DISCUSSION 
 
The empirical research has proved that different motives, which were tested in statistical 
models, differ in their importance for individual companies in the sample.  Some of them 
are considered very relevant for most of the companies and others only for specific groups 
of companies (for instance in some of the branches).  Also the impact of the perceived 
importance of individual motives on the general probability of becoming a takeover target 
is not homogeneous. 
 
I also found out that market motives are expected to dominate (in the opinion of managers 
from the Slovenian sample of privatised companies) the takeover process in Slovenia.  
Especially foreign bidders are expected to take over Slovenian companies to gain access to 
their market shares - mainly in Slovenia.  On average, financial and other more specific 
motives seem to be less important than market motives.   
 
Testing a number of financial ratios and other publicly available information in ordered 
probit models also proved that different motives of bidders are reflected in different 
preferences about characteristics of target companies.  In other words, bidders select 
targets by setting up the criteria that is dependent on their motives.  Different motives 
mean different criteria and therefore different ‘desired’ characteristics of potential targets.  
This means that the same quality (reflected in publicly available information) of the target 
company may be desirable to one bidder and not desirable to another.  Actually, the same 
target company may be interesting to the second bidder for another of its qualities that is 
irrelevant or even unacceptable to the first one.  The model predicting probability of a 
takeover for such a company is crippled by the fact that the predictive power of the 
variable representing such a quality of the target company will be nullified due to counter-
effects of different expectations - desired target characteristics - of the two or more (groups 
of) bidders.   
 
The statistical verification of the hypothesis explained above has not only important 
theoretical, but also interesting practical implications.  Different bidders can have different 
motives, even when trying to gain control of the same target company, which also means 
that the economic outcome of such takeovers can be different - depending on which 
bidder/motive wins the ‘takeover battle’.  Obviously this conclusion gives some additional 
room to discuss policy issues, too. 
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